Ruling party-owned business (Parbus) empires arise from a total capture, by an insurgent vanguard party, of key institutions in fragile market economies. The Parbus can be a market-defying form of grand corruption or a market-conforming innovation for party-led growth. This paper offers a theoretical framework buttressed by two analytical country studies. The impact of Parbus on wealth creation and distribution explained by four regime characteristics: insecurity, organizational capacity, ideology, and centralization. Three possible evolutionary paths are identified: paragonist favoring transition to an open system, parasitic leading to poverty-tyranny trap, and mutualist or uneasy coexistence of state, party, and private actors.
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and the possible pathways out of the party-state system as income rises. Section 5 concludes with summary and suggested areas for further research.
II. Toward a Theory of Parbus Behavior
Current fashion in development economics, which rarely offers definitive answers to many fundamental questions, favors institution-based explanations for the enormous and persistent gaps in cross-country economic performance 2 .
Good institutions-enduring formal and informal rules that govern social, economic, or political interaction-are thought to be those that provide positive incentives for engaging in individually as well as socially rational economic behavior. Those institutions that give rise to political polarization and economic inequality, by discouraging productive use of scarce resources and by failing to resolve distributional contests in a low-cost manner, harm the cause of shared prosperity.
The literature on the political economy of Africa tends to focus on party formation, state capacity, and the intersection between the two within the broader context of patrimonial relations-domestic as well as global. African polities, it is often argued, display certain peculiarities such as pervasive patronage, winner-take-all politics, and distributional contests that prioritize state capture over market capture. In an environment of underdevelopment, power relations accentuate informality and reciprocity because of the low fixed cost (but high marginal cost) of enforcing commitments since interactions are limited to tightly-knit communities.
A popular but contested conceptual entry point is neopatrimonialism in all its renderings (developmentalist, parasitic, or neutral). African polities and economies are viewed in this literature in pathological terms whose implied remedy is adopting some version of an external model-Eurocentric or Nipponian. Ironically this diagnosis is 5 sometimes coupled with calls for government leadership in support of the private sector.
Mkandawire, for example, attributes this to the reliance on such concepts as universalist and vacuous concepts as patrimonialism which have weak analytical content (Mkandawire, 2001 ).
Given the history of easy access to land for farmers and pastoralists in much of Africa, some students of African politics (Hyden, 2008; Kelsall, 2008) urge serious rethinking of orthodox analytical approaches and policy advice that require going "against the grain" of long-enduring African practices whose persistence must have a deeply rational basis. This perspective requires a good grasp of the underpinnings of relationship-based systems that put a high premium on loyalty. The endogeneity of economics and politics also means that it is essential to have a contextual understanding of the origins and roles of formal institutions in shaping incentives of paramount importance.
A number of African governments have not respected the requisite formal and informal restraints against mixing politics and economics. Some have even gone so far as to obliterate the state-party distinction--the ruling parties in Eritrea and Ethiopia being the primary examples. Other countries with nascent party business include Rwanda, Malawi, Uganda, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. Temptations in this direction by the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa are particularly instructive given the presence of a free press and a well established legal system (Brunner and Robinson, 2006) . The purported role of a South African holding company, Chancellor House (a nascent Parbus) has scandalized the ANC. Chancellor House, a private trust-held entity registered as a charitable trust, owns stakes in several companies, primarily in South Africa's booming resource extraction industry. The board of trustees, which includes three prominent ANC members, enjoys broad discretionary power to choose who receives profits made by the trust. In practice, the proceeds of the company are funneled directly into ANC's party coffers.
Our working hypothesis, built around four empirically measurable explanatory variables (insecurity, organizational capacity, ideological predisposition, and degree of state centralization), may be stated as follows. The first hypothesis addresses the conditions of existence for Parbus while the second deals with their impact and evolutionary paths:
The Parbus emerge in low-income societies under four conditions each of which is necessary, but sufficient only collectively: the ruling party is deeply insecure because of its dependence on external financial resources and its legitimacy to rule is undergirded by a narrow political base; the party acquired substantial organizational capacity before assuming power which enables it to discipline cadres and followers and to efficiently manage scarce resources; the party relies on a populist ideology to motivate an extensive patronage system and to mount an ambitious program of development in countries that lack substantial natural-resource rents; and, finally, the party has captured a state that was highly centralized, often as a result of a revolution or a long experience as a colony, thereby preempting the emergence of an autonomous business class or independent civic/political movements.
H2: Whether such a vanguard party will be developmentalist or parasitic would depend on its organizational competence, the appropriateness of its big ideas for development, and its eagerness to solidify political legitimacy and survival by reconciling the competing interests of Party, State, and society.
With respect to H1, the analytical challenge is to do comparative political-economic analysis by focusing on the interface between the political and the economic, and identifying formal and informal networks involving state, party, business society, and civil society.
With respect to H2, the challenge of distinguishing the developmentalist tendency from the parasitic tendency would entail identification of the conditions of existence for the blatant fusion of political power and economic power. Just as importantly, one has to delineate the pathways of successful transition to a constitutional political order and a competitive economy where it would pay more to be an economic entrepreneur in the private sector than to be a political entrepreneur under the protection of a captive state.
The switch from a redistributive regime to a productive regime is induced, at least in theory, by a number of factors. One decisive game changer is "leadership" which may be a product of existential crisis to the state-a factor that is invoked to explain why authoritarian East Asian leaders engaged in "good corruption" by twinning the buildup of personal wealth with that of productive investment. Leadership is perhaps a product of random luck. Either way, once the poverty-tyranny trap is broken, long-term and shortterm goals can be reconciled as popular trust in leaders buys the patience of the citizenry to shoulder the front-loaded costs of radical reform, and permit appropriate formal institutions to take root.
So far, we addressed motivations, capacity and probable triggers that collectively feed the propensity of monoparties in poor post-conflict market economies for building business empires. What about the behavior of party-owned companies themselves in the light of their soft budget constraints (Kornai, 1992) and the politically-slanted directives from their owners?
Figure 1 depicts illustrative cases of partial equilibria in a market populated by independent private firms and politically-connected firms. The illustrations are based on the following assumptions which are intended to capture the typical environment in which Parbus are found: firms in the formal modern sector consist of medium-scale and largescale enterprises, firms in the same industry face similar cost structures and enjoy some market power (not price takers), the politically-unconnected private firms maximize longterm profits which means that they may choose to maximize sales to gain market share but only on a temporary basis, and the politically-connected Parbus may maximize profits or revenue at all times depending on Party directives.
The behavior of the two proto-typical competitor firms would take the following forms. If both firms maximize profits, then each firm equates marginal revenue (MR) and marginal cost (MC) to attain equilibrium (P1, Q1, L1). A level playing field prevails. If, on the other hand, both firms maximize revenue (and employment), then the corresponding equilibrium will be (P3, Q3, L3). Output will normally be set to ensure break-even price covering average cost.
Suppose now that the ruling party is hostile to the private competitor, and wishes to squeeze out the latter's profits (say, through discriminatory applications of taxes and regulations or rigging government bids) to a point where the firm is severely hamstrung but not eliminated. The effect will be much like the use of limit-pricing by an oligopolist in a Figure 1 The Behavior Parbus and Private Firms in Governed Markets
contestable market trying to discourage the entry of a potential competitor. The Parbus will increase its market share only if it is permitted to re-invest much of its profits.
To illustrate the impact of differential treatment on firm behavior, let us consider the impact of the issuance of new export licenses. This policy will result in a shift in demand to D2 and triggers a race between the two firms to capture the additional market. The private firm is induced to devote real resources to rent seeking in the form of lobbying and bribery costs. The equilibrium for the private firm changes to (P2, Q2, L2 Bank, 1993; Wu, 2005) .
The experiences of the two countries underscore instead the fact that politics and economics are intertwined with the first assuming primacy in the early stages of development and the latter in the advanced stages; that modern markets ironically presuppose the existence of capable, disciplined and accountable states, that viable states rely on a productive, competitive and autonomous private sector; and, contrary to standard institutionalist conceptions, bureaucracies cannot be reduced to mere rules and normspolicies are also profoundly shaped by internal politics with personalities, factions, and agency chains serving as important filters (Wu, 2005; Fields, 1998; O'Donnell, 2010) .
The founding and ruling party of Taiwan, from which the current Ethiopian leadership is said to find inspiration, maintained for nearly half a century a substantial portfolio of commercial assets. A key difference, however, is that a politically confident KMT made public basic financial information on its business holdings, while Ethiopia's party endowments remain notoriously opaque.
We will now build our two case studies around the four key variables we identified earlier in formulating the working hypothesis: regime insecurity, party capability, party ideology, and state centralization. More attention will be given to the Ethiopian case since it has been less researched and understood.
KMT's Taiwan
Following the defeat of the Japanese in World War II, the island colony of Taiwan The hallmark of KMT's development strategy was its market-conforming nature.
Through activist and flexible policies, it laid down the foundations of a sound market economy by the end of the 1960s. For over four decades, the party-state intervened in the economy with a paternalistic heavy hand-nurturing, protecting, and regulating domestic markets. Building on the legacies of a colonial economy, Taiwan successfully pursued structural transformation and rapid growth. Like South Korea and mainland China, Taiwan successfully pursued a strategy of enhancing the productivity of smallholder agriculture. As importantly, it integrated smallholder farming with small-scale agro-
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processing by exploiting decentralized networks. However, unlike Korea which opted for a chaebol-led modern sector, Taiwan's development strategy favored agile small and medium enterprises which today comprise some 90 percent of the nation's enterprises.
The record of economic performance during the take-off phase Li, 1998 , appendix tables).
Industrial deepening into secondary import substitution and export promotion paved the way for political liberalization in Taiwan 
KMT's Business Empire
KMT companies had their origins in the legacies of Japanese colonialism and the (Xu, 1997; Pu, 2005) .
Financial statements of the KMT's seven holding companies for 1998 showed total assets of NT$147 Billion. Many observers, however, estimate that this figure to be much higher, as the KMT has overseas assets that are not listed with the holding companies.
Being the fifth biggest business syndicate in Taiwan, the KMT not only has a financial edge in political campaigns, but it has for too long exerted considerable leverage over the business community.
Since 1992, the party managed its commercial empire through seven holding companies, two of which are quite big (Central Investment and Gurghua Investment).
Central with 60 affiliated firms concentrated in finance and petrochemicals while Kwang
Hwa with 58 firms specialized in gas supply. Chii Sheng Industrial with 26 firms focused on construction and real estate while Jen Hwa with 28 affiliates specialized in securities and venture capital. King Dom focused on life insurance while Hua Hsia with 11 firms had altogether from engaging in for-profit activities. The assets, it was widely suggested, belong to the public sector and must therefore be transferred to the state or to independent non-governmental charities. The KMT itself, mindful of shifting public sentiments and the coming of competitive multiparty elections, argued for the establishment of a trust to manage Parbus-generated funds (Low, 2000) . A decade later, press accounts suggest that most of the KMT assets, with the notable exception of Central Investment Holding Co, could not be accounted for (I-ming, 2010).
Consistent with H2, the KMT took well over three decades to feel confident enough to contemplate embracing a fully competitive economic system and a multiparty political This outcome was by no means planned or easy. It was rather a product of pragmatic imagination on the part of many trailblazers within the party and those discharged from the government who then joined the party bureaucracy. Revenues generated by The Parbus helped the party to maintain an extensive patronage system (especially social welfare support for war veterans) to buy the loyalty of cadres and followers (such as voter mobilization). It was also used to co-opt or threaten emerging competitors using gangsters linked to KMT-run businesses or neutralizing competitors by gaining leverage over native businesses.
The existence of Parbus, therefore, had two contradictory effects. On the one hand, it was a major factor in maintaining the monopoly of political power by the KMT elite (Matsumoto, 2002) . On the other hand, the existence of party assets may have contributed to the willingness of the ruling elite after 2000 to seriously entertain divesting control of state assets thereby providing a soft landing toward multi-partyism.
As noted earlier, the key to understanding why politics is the key driver of regime attitude toward economic policy requires a full appreciation of the sources of its insecurity and the limitations of its capability. We return to these issues after taking a closer look at the Ethiopian experience.
EPRDF's Ethiopia
Ethiopia accommodated three distinct postwar regimes: Monarchy (1941-74), Derg Aside from the Parbus, the Ethiopian formal private sector economy is dominated by three entities: budding Ethiopian DBGs and large multinationals. A good example of the former is East African Holdings 4 (owned by Buzuayehu Tadele and family) which is a public corporation with more than nine affiliate groups and 5,000 employees. East African is involved in manufacturing, agro-processing, printing, real state, and import-export trading along with a highly developed domestic distribution system. Another example is the Sunshine Group of companies (owned and managed by Samuel Tafesse) which runs Sunshine Construction-the country's largest construction firm (Sutton and Kellow, 2010) .
The private sector has recently attracted a number of FDI companies and groups.
However shares, become legal partners with the power to run the companies and to appoint managers (Seifu, 2010; Sutton and Kellow, 2010) .
The EPRDF government is clearly committed to long-term economic development and poverty reduction. It has managed annual growth rate of GDP in the range of 5-6 percent in the 1990s and 7-8 percent in the 2000s thanks largely to the large inflows of aid 5 .
However, the Government's claim of double-digit growth rates since 2005 and promises of the same in the next five years (GOE, 2010) are clearly unrealistic. The exaggerated claims appear to be intended to signal to the population that rapid growth should be an acceptable compensation for the denial of democratic governance.
EPRDF's Business Empire
There are four large umbrella Parbus-holding endowments in Ethiopia today. The four constitute the heart of the EPRDF complex of companies which also includes for-profit entities owned or co-owned by allied regional elites and politically-connected 
Incubating a Golden Goose: The Story of Formosa Plastics
Compared to its South Korean counterpart, the KMT state had a more ambivalent stance toward the private sector-it had to reconcile its anti-business bias (fearful of an independent power base by owners of large private businesses) and its recognition of the legitimating value of market-driven growth. To reconcile these conflicting goals, it pursed a policy of both protecting and restricting large enterprises. Examples of state-fostered private enterprises include firms in the textile industry, the Formosa PVC project and Xinzhu Glass Plant. Formosa Plastics Corporation was established in the early 1950s as a result of the push by the Industrial Development Council (IDC) which singled out plastics for promotion and insisted that it be private. Using four selection criteria for picking winners (medium size, efficient, quick operation, and ready market), the Bank of Taiwan was asked to check for a potential investor with adequate deposits. It recommended Wang Yongqing, a rice merchant whose earlier interest in plastics and tires had received a cold shoulder from the IDC authorities because of his ignorance of manufacturing. Mr. Wang was apparently persuaded to take over the PVC project with promises of considerable technical support from IDC.
The first build-operate-transfer plastics plant in Taiwan was then built under government supervision in 1954 with about a million dollar loan from U.S. aid agencies. The plastics project, the smallest PVC plant in the world at that time, was sold to Mr. Wang in 1957. To ameliorate the high cost and the absence of local downstream industries, a strategy of vertical integration was adopted.
Two corporations were established before the end of the decade to produce secondary products such as pipes and film, and tertiary products such as bags and shoes. Soon an internationally competitive petrochemical industry emerged. The Formosa Plastics Group (FPG) diversified into the textile industry in 1965, staple fiber in 1967, nylon and acrylic fiber in 1974, became one of the largest producers of fiber in the world, printed circuit boards in 1984, oil refinery and petrochemicals, and production of LCDs and DRAMs by 1995. FPG also owns hospitals and a university.
Besides being the world's biggest producer of VCM and the second-largest maker of PVC, FPG today is the largest private enterprise in Taiwan. By the time of Mr. Wang's death in 2008, the conglomerate the oligarch built had a secure international reach along with a net income before taxes of over US$9 billion. Mr. Wang died with the pedigree of the richest man in Taiwan.
The incubation and continued support of FPG and other promising private firms is a remarkable cautionary tale of a pragmatic, experimental approach to development that successfully groped toward the harmonization of the competing interests of the ruling party, business, and society. The three-way partnership (government, party, and private sector), it must be noted, did not always pick winners. The Korean War fortuitously provided a much-needed demand. Nor was the IDC dominated by pro-market bureaucrats. In this case, the state picked a promising sunrise import-substituting industry rather than a winning firm per se, and provided timely support for the upgrading of technological and marketing capability. 
Box 4 Strangling a Golden Goose: The Story of Ethiopia Amalgamated
Ethiopia Amalgamated Ltd (EAL), was established in 1964 and became Ethiopia's largest private agricultural supply company. Mr. Gebreyesus Begna took over EAL and built it into a diversified agro-marketing company with interests in fertilizer importing and domestic marketing, commodity trading, shipping, and transit services.
Starting in 1984, fertilizer importation, distribution, and pricing were controlled by government enterprises. With a change in government in 1991, the private sector was allowed to participate in fertilizer importation and distribution following the issuance of the National Fertilizer Policy in 1993. At the same time, the incoming EPRDF-run government created a number of partyowned companies which enjoyed preferential treatment in the allocation of foreign exchange to importers and retail credit to farmers. By the end of the decade, there were a handful of fertilizer marketing agencies in the market: the government-owned Agricultural Input Supply Enterprise (AISE), the privately-owned firms (EAL and Fertiline), and three EPRDF-owned endowment enterprises (Ambassel in Amhara, Guna in Tigray, and Disnho in Oromia regional states). Regional governments accelerated support for their own enterprises and for affiliated farmer's cooperative unions (FCU) by providing government staff, credit, collateral, storage facilities, and transport for their retailing operations. Regional states, including Addis Ababa, also controlled virtually all of micro-financing to farmers and small enterprises. Local authorities were used to enforce fertilizers debt collection. This augmented government/party coffers as poor farmers transferred any productivity gains to their politically-connected creditors. By 2001, the party companies and FCUs have driven out independent private operators to account for 100% of fertilizer imports and local distribution. In 2006, FCUs accounted for 60% fertilizer sale-exactly equal to that of AISE in 1996.
The discriminatory methods used to drive EAL out of the market took various forms: denial of access to the fertilizer market as district (wereda) stores became critical nodes, credit facilities and donor-provided foreign currency allocated for fertilizer; intimidation and harassment of EAL's agents; frustrating sales and distribution contracts, forbidding delivery of fertilizer already sold; imposing taxes on EAL that are not applied to its favored competitors; and cancellation of a major import bid EAL won by denying a routinely-given letter of credit to cover the forex from state banks.
EAL's headquarter buildings were then foreclosed on by the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia and sold to a government-owned brewery on May 18, 2004. Ethiopia's largest private agricultural inputs and outputs marketing company was thus liquidated with 400 employees losing their jobs.
The subsequently exiled owner-director of EAL distilled the lessons from this saga in the following terms (Addis Tribune March 19, 2003) : "Although the Ethiopian government overtly pledged allegiance to free market principles and invited the private sector to participate in the economic development of the country, it covertly pursued policies that favored party owned enterprises to engage in commercial activities such as fertilizer importation and distribution to create steady revenue streams to finance party activities to the detriment of genuine private sector companies, and the poor Ethiopian farmers who live from hand to mouth." The fusion of control over state banks, ministries, regional governments, party companies and affiliated coops provided the ruling party myriad instruments to hamstring the bona fide private sector by frustrating the emergence of contestable credit, fertilizer and seed markets. endowment-owned firms, on average larger, are less constrained by investment climate issues and are more likely to be consulted on policy issues" (emphasis taken).
So, consistent with H1 and H2, the EPRDF has yet to muster the self-confidence to escape its ethnic cocoon and dogmatic ideology to credibly open up sufficient space for other fundamental societal groups to freely pursue their legitimate interests. Entering its third decade at the helm of state power, it has yet to fully privatize the commanding heights in the state sector, continues to expand and consolidate party businesses, and shows no let up in accentuating the differentiation between allies and competitors, or insiders and outsiders.
IV. Rent seeking, developmentalist, or both?
If Parbus is a mongrel that emerges prior to the modern institutional separation of the state and the economy, what then are the theoretical and historical pathways toward a transparent, accountable, and openly competitive political and economic system? In other words, will party-state capitalism in Africa end up formalizing political corruption or will it instead become progressively developmentalist as in the case of Taiwan?
Three trajectories suggest themselves with respect to the long-term equilibrium political and economic outcome. We dub them: paragonic, parasitic, or mutualist. Each trajectory has its own economic and political ramifications in terms of its nature (conserving or transforming) and the possible triggers for turning points.
The Paragonist Path prevails in the case of a progressive withering away of party-led economic institutions as they outlive their usefulness thereby resolving the intrinsic tension between stability and modernization (Huntington, 1970) . Ruling parties that are competent and attuned to popular sentiment have a strong incentive to allow Parbus and Govbus to evolve into virtuous handmaidens of a market-led economy with a competitive private sector eventually assuming the role of economic leadership. China is recognizably traversing this path. The historical experience of Taiwan, and in some respects Afrikaaner- Ethiopia today finds itself at the cross-roads of the parasitic and mutualist paths 8 .
The Ethiopian case illustrates the difficulties of moving away from an ethnocentric regime that put a high premium on creating minority rule based on political-cum-economic dominance when the domestic economic engine is not robust enough to deliver the promised prosperity along Taiwanese lines. Prosperity enables such narrowly-based regimes to rely less on ethnic fracturing and cultivated primordial loyalty (of co-ethnics, or co-religionists, or co-regionalists) and more on calculated cooptation of potential contenders, and restoring legitimacy for state institutions.
V. Concluding Observations
A Parbus-based fusion of political power and economic power, by being institutionalized, does not neatly fit traditional conceptions of episodic and individualized corruption, central planning, public enterprises, bona fide private enterprises, or oligarchy.
Party-state capitalism is a rather novel phenomenon which adds an important dimension to the debate on developmental states and neo-patrimonialism in Africa.
The KMT-EPRDF comparative analysis suggests that, at the extreme ends of economic and political governance, the Parbus can be a market-defying formalization of grand corruption or a market-facilitating strategy of shared growth. The (parasitic) rentseeking interpretation is that the party-owned business group is an ingeniously disguised mechanism for tunneling public assets and for creating economic rent in resource-poor, post-conflict societies where the private sector is underdeveloped and the state is a big economic prize. The argument is that political overlords who capture bureaucratic authoritarian states in weak societies, unlike oligarchies, often lack a secure political base and an autonomous economic base in the private sector prior to assuming state power. A well-organized group of political entrepreneurs then have a strong incentive to convert political power into economic power, including using party ownership of business entities under various guises.
The charitable, developmental-vanguard, interpretation is that party-owned business empires constitute an innovative "third way" for responding effectively to the double whammy of market failure and government failure. The Parbus can help solve coordination failures and informational failures where the predominantly service and mercantile private sector. The Parbus then affords the ruling party investable funds to underwrite shared prosperity thereby earning the legitimacy to rule at low cost.
This paper makes a modest contribution to the scanty literature on the political economy of party states by offering a general theoretical framework that is buttressed by two analytical studies of canonical cases. It sought to identify a nexus of key explanatory variables and the probable conditions under which one of the two tendenciesdevelopmental or parasitic-is likely to dominate in a given setting. It concludes that the genesis and net impact of Parbus on long-term wealth creation and distribution revolves around four empirically measurable variables: regime insecurity, organizational capacity, populist ideology, and degree of centralization of the inherited state. Interactions among these factors generate three possible paths of evolution: a paragonist path (KMT's Taiwan) favoring a competitive politico-economic system, a parasitic path toward a poverty-tyranny trap, or an unstable mutualist path of coexistence among state, party, and private actors.
Two lines of further research will surely advance our knowledge of the Parbus phenomenon markedly, both of which depend on the availability of establishment-level data. One is micro level (enterprises, groups, regions, sectors) studies of how party companies differ from private and state competitors in terms of choice of economic activity, method of competition, and disposition of net income. The other is a study of decision-making at both the level of the enterprise and the holding company with a focus on the role of individuals and factions who grapple to reconcile self-serving political dogma with the imperatives of economic globalization.
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